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A HAIR PIECE: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE INTERSECTION OF RACE
AND GENDER
PAULETrE M. CALDWELL*
I. OF SMALL BEGINNINGS
A. Rediscovering My Hair
I want to know my hair again, to own it, to delight in it again, to recall
my earliest mirrored reflection when there was no beginning and I first
knew that the person who laughed at me and cried with me and stuck
out her tongue at me was me. I want to know my hair again, the way I
knew it before I knew that my hair is me, before I lost the right to me,
before I knew that the burden of beauty-or tack of it-for an entire
race of people could be tied up with my hair and me.
I want to know my hair again, the way I knew it before I knew Sambo
and Dick, Buckwheat and Jane, Prissy and Miz Scarlett. Before I knew
that my hair could be wrong-the wrong color, the wrong texture, the
wrong amount of curl or straight Before hot combs and thick grease
and smelly-burning lye, all guaranteed to transform me, to silken the
coarse, resistent wool that represents me. I want to know once more the
time before I denatured, denuded, denigrated, and denied my hair and
me, before I knew enough to worry about edges and kitchens and bur-
rows and knots, when I was still a friend of water-the rain's dancing
drops of water, a swimming hole's splashing water, a hot, muggy day's
misty invisible water, my own salty, sweaty, perspiring water.
When will I cherish my hair again, the way my grandmother cherished
it, when fascinated by its beauty, with hands carrying centuries-old
secrets of adornment and craftswomanship, she plaited it, twisted it,
cornrowed it, finger-curled it, olive-oiled it, on the growing moon cut and
shaped it, and wove it like fine strands of gold inlaid with semiprecious
stones, coral and ivory, telling with my hair a lost-found story of the
people she carried inside her?
Mostly, I want to love my hair the way I loved hers, when as grand-
daughter among grandsons I stood on a chair in her room-her kitchen-
bed-living-dining room--and she let me know her hair, when I combed
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and patted it from the crown of her head to the place where her ntck
folded into her shoulders, caressing steel-gray strands that framed her
forehead before falling into the soft, white, cottony temples at the border
of her cheekbones.
Cotton. Cotton curled up in soft, fuzzy puffballs around her face. Cot-
ton pulled out and stretched on top of her head into Sunday
pompadours. Cotton, like the cotton blooming in August in her tiny cot-
ton field. Cotton, like the cotton that filled the other room in her
house-the cotton room-the storehouse for September's harvest, a cra-
dle to shield her pickings from wind and rain, to await baling and gin-
ning and cashing in. Cotton, which along with a cow, a pig and a coop
of chickens, allowed her to eke out a husband-dead, children-gone inde-
pendence in some desolate place, trapped in the bowels of segregation.
Here, unheard, unseen, free, she and her beauty and her hair could not
be a threat to anyone,
B. On Being the Subject of a Law School Hypothetical
The case of Rogers v. American Airlines I upheld the right of employ-
ers to prohibit categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the
workplace. The plaintiff, a black woman, argued that American Airline's
policy discriminated against her specifically as a black woman. In effect,
she based her claim on the interactive effects of racial and gender dis-
crimination. The court chose, however, to base its decision principally
on distinctions between biological and cultural conceptions of race.
More importantly, it treated the plaintiff's claims of race and gender dis-
crimination in the alternative and independent of each other, thus deny-
ing any interactive relationship between the two.
Although Rogers is the only reported decision that upholds the cate-
gorical exclusion of braided hairstyles,2 the prohibition of such styles in
the workforce is both widespread and longstanding. Protests surround-
ing recent cases in Washington, D.C. sparked national media attention.
Nearly fifty women picketed a Hyatt Hotel, and black political leaders
threatened to boycott hotels that prohibit black women from wearing
braids.3 Several employees initiated legal action by filing complaints with
federal or local fair employment practices agencies; most cases were set-
1. 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
2. Rogers relied on Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D.
Ga. 1981) (1981 WL 224). In Carswell, the employer discharged the plaintiff for wearing beads
woven into a braided hairstyle. The prohibition applied to jewelry and other items and was justified
by safety precautions for employees working in a hospital for psychiatric and substance-abusing
patients. Significantly, the court noted that the hospital did not categorically prohibit the wearing of
either braided or Afro hairstyles.
3. See Shipp, Braided Hair Style At Issue in Protests Over Dress Codes, N.Y. Times, Sept. 23,
1987, at C14, col. 1.
[Vol. 1991:365
A HAIR PIECE
tied shortly thereafter. No court has yet issued an opinion that contro-
verts Rogers.
I discovered Rogers while reading a newspaper article describing the
actual or threatened firing of several black women in metropolitan Wash-
ington, D.C. solely for wearing braided hairstyles.4 The article referred
to Rogers but actually focused on the case of Cheryl Tatum, who was
fired from her job as a restaurant cashier in a Hyatt Hotel under a com-
pany policy that prohibited "extreme and unusual hairstyles."' 5
The newspaper description of the Hyatt's grooming policy conjured
up an image of a ludicrous and outlandishly-coiffed Cheryl Tatum, one
clearly bent on exceeding the bounds of workplace taste and discipline.
But the picture that accompanied the article revealed a young, attractive
black woman whose hair fell neatly to her shoulders in an all-American,
common, everyday pageboy style, distinguished only by the presence of
tiny braids in lieu of single strands of hair.
Whether motivated by politics, ethnic pride, health, or vanity, I was
outraged by the idea that an employer could regulate or force me to ex-
plain something as personal and private as the way that I groom my hair.
I resented the implication that I could not be trusted to choose standards
appropriate for the workplace6 and that my right to work could be condi-
tioned on my disassociation with my race, gender, and culture. Mostly, I
marveled with sadness that something as simple as a black woman's hair
continues to threaten the social, political, and economic fabric of Ameri-
can life.
My anger eventually subsided, and I thought little more about Rog-
ers until a student in my course in Employment Discrimination Law
4. Shipp, supra note 3, at Cl.
5. Braided hairstyles are often prohibited under management interpretations of general
grooming code provisions. However, according to Washington, D.C. attorney Eric Steele, many
companies have adopted written policies that specifically prohibit braided hairstyles.
6. In Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979), the plaintiff
was suspended for refusing to comply with a policy that required female tellers, office, and manage-
rial employees to wear a uniform selected by the employer, whereas men in the same positions were
allowed to wear normal business attire of their own choosing. The employer had dispensed with a
comparable requirement for uniforms applicable to male employees from 1958 to 1969. The em-
ployer's counsel sought to justify the limitation on female employees, stating that, although the
employer trusted the business judgment of its female employees,
the selection of attire ... on the part of women is not a matter of business judgment. It is a
matter of taste, a matter of what the other women are wearing, what fashion is currently.
... Somehow, the women who have excellent business judgment... tend to follow those
[fashions] and they don't seem to equate that with a matter of business judgment.
Id. at 1033. On the last Tuesday of every month (when uniforms were being cleaned) and during
Christmas week, women employees were exempted from the uniform requirement. (These days were
referred to by the employer as "glamour days.") The employer admitted that on these days women
employees never wore improper business attire. Id.
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asked me after class to explain the decision. I promised to take up the
case when we arrived at that point in the semester where the issues raised
by Rogers fit most naturally in the development of antidiscrimination
law.
Several weeks passed, and the student asked about Rogers again and
again (always privately, after class); yet I always put off answering her
until some point later in the semester. After all, hair is such a little thing.
Finally, while participating in a class discussion on a completely unre-
lated topic, the persistent one's comments wandered into the forbidden
area of braided-hair cases. As soon as the student realized she had pub-
licly introduced the subject of braided hair, she stopped in mid-sentence
and covered her mouth in embarrassment, as if she had spoken out of
turn. I was finally forced to confront what the student had obviously
sensed in her embarrassment.
I had avoided private and public discussions about braided hair not
because the student had asked her questions at the wrong point in the
semester. Nor had I avoided the subject because cases involving em-
ployer-mandated hair and grooming standards do not illustrate as well as
other cases the presence of deeply-ingrained myths, negative images, and
stereotypes that operate to define the social and economic position of
blacks and women. I had carefully evaded the subject of a black wo-
man's hair because I appeared at each class meeting wearing a neatly-
braided pageboy, and I resented being the unwitting object of one in
thousands of law school hypotheticals.
C. Why Would Anyone Want to Wear Their Hair That Way?7
Discussing braided hair styles with students did not threaten me in
places where I had become most assured. I was personally at ease in my
professionalism after a decade of law practice and nearly as many years
as a law professor. I had lost-or become more successful in denying-
any discomfort that I once may have experienced in discussing issues of
race and gender in the too few occasions in the legal profession devoted
to their exploration. I had even begun to smart less when confronted
with my inability to change being the only, or one of inevitably too few,
7. According to Cheryl Tatum, the Hyatt's personnel manager, a woman, said: "I can't
understand why you would want to wear your hair like that anyway. What would our guests think if
we allowed you all to wear your hair like that?" Shipp, supra note 3, at C14. Employers often rely
on "customer preference" to justify the imposition of certain requirements on employees or to
restrict, on the grounds of race or sex, the persons who can occupy certain jobs. This justification
typically amounts to nothing more than the expression of the preferences of the employer or a
subterfuge for the exploitation of the images of employees for economic advantage. See Binder, Sex
Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1091 (1971); see
also infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
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blacks on the faculty of a traditionally white law school. But I was not
prepared to adopt an abstract, dispassionate, objective stance to an issue
that so obviously affected me personally; nor was I prepared to suffer
publicly, through intense and passionate advocacy, the pain and outrage
that I experience each time a black woman is dismissed, belittled, and
ignored simply because she challenges our objectification.
Should I be put to the task of choosing a logical, credible, "legiti-
mate," legally-sympathetic justification out of the many reasons that may
have motivated me and other black women to braid our own hair? Per-
haps we do so out of concern for the health of our hair, which many of us
risk losing permanently after years of chemical straighteners; or perhaps
because we fear that the entry of chemical toxins into our bloodstreams
through our scalps will damage our unborn or breastfeeding children.
Some of us choose the positive expression of ethnic pride not only for
ourselves, but also for our children, many of whom learn, despite all of
our teachings to the contrary, to reject association with black people and
black culture in search of a keener nose or bluer eye. Many of us wear
braids in the exercise of private, personal prerogatives taken for granted
by women who are not black.
Responding to student requests for explanations of cases is a regular
part of the profession of law teaching. I was not required, therefore, to
express or justify the reasons for my personal decision to braid my hair in
order to discuss the application of employment discrimination laws to
braided hairstyles. But by legitimizing the notion that the wearing of any
and all braided hairstyles in the workplace is unbusinesslike, Rogers
delegitimized me and my professionalism. I could not think of an answer
that would be certain to observe traditional boundaries in academic dis-
course between the personal and the professional.
The persistent student's embarrassed questioning and my obfusca-
tion spoke of a woman-centered silence: She, a white woman, had asked
me, a black woman, to justify my hair.8 She compelled me to account for
the presence of legal justifications for my simultaneously "perverse visi-
bility and convenient invisibility." 9 She forced me and the rest of the
class to acknowledge the souls of women who live by the circumscrip-
8. I know that the student intended no harm toward me. She, too, was disturbed by Rogers.
She had come to law school later in life than many of her classmates and was already experiencing
the prejudices of the labor market related to the intersection of gender and age. She seemed to sense
that something in the underlying racism and sexism in Rogers would ultimately affect her in a per-
sonal way.
9. McKay, Black Woman Professor-White University, 6 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L. F. 143, 144
(1983).
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tions of competing beliefs about white and black womanhood and in the
interstices of racism and sexism.
Our silence broken, the class moved beyond hierarchy to a place of
honest collaboration. Turning to Rogers, we explored the question of our
ability to comprehend through the medium of experience10 the way in
which a black woman's hair is related to the perpetuation of social, polit-
ical, and economic domination of subordinated racial and gender groups;
we asked why issues of experience, culture, and identity are not the sub-
ject of explicit legal reasoning. This Essay relates some of what we have
learned and what we need to know.
Hair seems to be such a little thing. Yet it is the little things, the
small everyday realities of life, that reveal the deepest meanings and val-
ues of a culture, give legal theory its grounding, and test its legitimacy.
II. To CHOOSE MYSELF: INTERLOCKING FIGURATIONS IN THE
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE AND GENDER
A. A Black Woman's Hair, A Black Woman's Place
SUNDAY School is out, my exams are graded, and I have unbraided
my hair a few days before my appointment at the beauty parlor to have
it braided again. After a year in braids, my hair is healthy again: long
and thick and cottony soft I decide not to french roll it or twist it or
pull it into a ponytail or bun or cover it with a scarf Instead, I comb it
out and leave it natural, in a full and big "Angela Davis" afro style. I
feel full and big and regal. I walk the three blocks from my apartment
to the subway. I see a white male colleague walking in the opposite
direction and I wave to him from across the street. He stops, squints his
eyes against the glare of the sun and stares, trying to figure out who has
greeted him He recognizes me and starts to cross over to my side of the
street. I keep walking, fearing the possibility of his curiosity and needing
to be relieved of the strain of explanation.
MONDAY My hair is still unbraided, but I blow it out with a hair
dryer and pull it back into a ponytail tied at the nape of my neck before
I go to the law schooL I enter the building and run into four whitefemale colleagues on their way out to a white female lunch. Before I
can say hello, one of them blurts out, "It IS weirdl" Another drowns out
the first: "You look so young, like a teenager!" The third invites me to
join them for lunch while the fourth stands silently, observing my hair. I
mumble some excuse about lunch and, interject, almost apologetically,
10. The experience of racist, public degradation on account of hair texture is not exclusive to
black women. Since I began teaching Rogers and issues that relate to the intersection of race and
gender, many white women students have told me (always privately) that they have been disparaged
and have suffered low self-esteem because the texture of their hair is too close to that of a black
woman. This disparagement and public ridicule typically begins for them near the age of puberty,
when issues of beauty, sexuality, and desirability are of singular importance.
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that I plan to get my hair braided again the next day. When I arrive at
my office suite and run into the white male I had greeted on Sunday, I
realize immediately that he has told the bunch on the way to lunch
about our encounter the day before He mutters something about how
different I look today, then asks me whether the day before I had been
on my way to a ceremony. He and the others are generally nice col-
leagues, so I half-smile, but say nothing in response Ifeel a lot less full
and big and regal
TUESDAY. I walk to the garage under my apartment building, again
wearing a big, full "Angela Davis" afro. Another white male colleague
passes me by, not recognizing me I greet him and he smiles broadly
saying that he has never seen me look more beautiful I smile back,
continue the chit chat for a moment more and try not to think about
whether he is being disingenuous I slowly get into my car, buckle up,
relax, and turn on the radio. It will take me about forty-five minutes to
drive uptown to the beauty parlor, park my car, and get something to eat
before beginning the long hours of sitting and braiding. I feel good,
knowing that the braider will be ecstatic when she sees the results of her
healing handiwork I keep my movements small, easy, and slow, relish-
ing in a rare, short morning of being free.
B. When Race and Gender Intersect
My initial outrage notwithstanding, Rogers is an unremarkable deci-
sion. Courts generally protect employer-mandated hair and dress codes,
and they often accord the greatest deference to codes that classify indi-
viduals on the basis of socially-conditioned rather than biological differ-
ences.11 And although Rogers rests on one line of authority without
acknowledging the existence of another, grooming codes are governed by
decisional law that clearly lacks conceptual coherence. 12 All in all, such
cases are generally considered only marginally significant in the battle to
secure equal employment rights.
But Rogers is regrettably unremarkable in an important respect. It
rests on suppositions that are deeply imbedded in American culture-
assumptions so entrenched and so necessary to the maintenance of inter-
locking, interdependent structures of domination that their mythological
bases and political functions have become invisible, especially to those to
whom their existence is most detrimental. Rogers proceeds from the
premise that, although racism and sexism share much in common, they
are nonetheless fundamentally unrelated phenomena-a proposition
proved false by history and contemporary reality. Racism and sexism
11. But see infra text accompanying note 66 for a discussion of the extent to which prejudice
and discrimination are motivated by cultural, rather than biological, differences among groups.
12. 1 R. RICHARDS, C. SULLIVAN & M. ZIMMER, EMPLOYMENT DISCiUMINATION § 8.5, at
349-53 (1988).
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are interlocking, mutually-reinforcing components of a system of domi-
nance rooted in patriarchy. No significant and lasting progress in com-
batting either can be made until this interdependent aspect of their
relation is acknowledged, and until the perspectives gained from consid-
ering their interaction are reflected in legal theory and public policy.
Black women are the immediate, although not exclusive, physical
and material representation of the intersection of race and gender.13 Pro-
gress against racism and sexism requires in addition, therefore, not only
an eradication of negative stereotypes about black womanhood and their
associated behavioral consequences, but also a recognition that theories
of legal protection that affect the material circumstances of black women
are not marginal to theories regarding race or gender, but rather are cen-
tral to both.14
Rogers is an exemplar of employment discrimination cases that in-
volve black women's physical image, negative stereotypes of black wo-
manhood, and the intersection of race and gender. The assumptions
underlying Rogers also appear in other areas, including those in which
facile conflations of biology and culture combine with the intersection of
race and gender to condition reproductive and lifestyle choices arguably
more fundamental than those of hairstyle.15
C. The Limitations of the Assumptions of Race-Sex Correspondence
and Independence
There is clearly a legal assumption of a race-sex correspondence or
of a race-sex parallel. Women and blacks share a common history in
terms of some elements of their legal status, although actual differences
in their social status and attitudes toward them were, and are, substan-
13. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99 for the effects of race-gender intersection on black
men and white women.
14. Questions arising at the intersection of race and gender have only recently been addressed
by legal scholars. See generally Austin, Sapphire Boundl, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539; Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination
Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics; 1989 U. CHI. LEOAL F. 139; Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1990). This late attention to the
intersection of race and gender is not unrelated to the low numbers, and experiences of, black women
professors in the legal academy. For an analysis of the relationship between the experiences of black
women academics and the development of black feminist thought, see Collins, The Social Construc-
tion of Black Feminist Thought, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERiCA 304 (1988).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32. The decision whether to characterize a dispute as
involving grooming or some arguably more fundamental right has significant consequences under
antidiscrimination law. The characterization as "grooming" often signals a trivialization of the
claim and a conclusion that no legally-protected employment and economic rights are involved. See,
e.g., Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766 F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). But the aesthetic order of a society
sets the norms of beauty and acceptability of the dominant group as the standard; this aesthetic
order is used, in turn, to justify the superior social and economic position of the dominant group.
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tial. For many purposes, the law does and should treat racism and sex-
ism as equivalent forms of bias, and theories and remedies developed in
considering one form should ordinarily extend to the other.16 This as-
sumption has clearly influenced the development of legal theory concern-
ing race and gender.17 Identifying parallels serves an important heuristic
function and provides a powerful tool to conceptualize and mobilize
resistance to inequality.
Correlative to the assumption of race-sex correspondence, there ex-
ists an equally powerful assumption of race-sex independence or distinc-
tiveness. 18 Also rooted in American history, particularly in the politics
of emancipation and suffrage, this assumption has contemporary mani-
festations in the existence of distinct political movements against racism
and sexism, the development of social policy along exclusively gender or
race lines, and the legal conceptualization of distinct approaches to issues
of race and gender. 19
Like race-sex correspondence, the existence of a belief in race-sex
distinctiveness is not itself a problem; it can serve important functions in
the development of comprehensive legal theory on questions of race and
gender. Considering actual or apparent differences between race and
gender may lead to important insights, which in turn may assist in con-
ceptualizing new approaches to challenging oppression based on either.
And if, through the correspondence of race and gender, we intend to
treat the two equally, and are committed to avoiding the development of
hierarchies of oppression or notions of essentialism, 20 then the intuitions
derived from treating them separately under a theory of race-sex inde-
16. A classic statement of the race-sex parallel appears in Gunnar Myrdal's study of American
race relations. See Myrdal, A Parallel to the Negro Problem, in AN AMERICAN DILEMMA 1073-78
(1944); see also Hacker, Women as a Minority Group, 30 Soc. FORCE 60 (1951); Johnston &
Knapp, Sex Discrimination By Law: A Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 675 (1971);
Murray, The Negro Woman's Stake in the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
253 (1971); Note, Sex Discrimination and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amend-
ment?, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1499 (1971).
17. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E.
NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW: CAusES AND REMEDIES 89-92 (1975).
18. Indeed, one could argue that the concentration on the race-sex parallel arises in part from
an implicit assumption about the differences between race and gender.
19. See generally King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black
Feminist Ideology, in BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA, supra note 14, at 265; Singleton, Race and
Gender in Feminist Theory, SAGE: SCHOLARLY J. ON BLACK WOMEN, Summer 1989, at 12-17.
20. But see Harris, supra note 14, at 588-89 (critiquing the essentialism within feminism and
the essentialism of gender, and suggesting the problems that can arise from the assumption of a
difference between race and gender).
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pendence will ultimately serve both. Any starting point will suffice if our
objective is to end domination based on race, gender, or both.21
Problems arise in the development of legal theory and social policy
when the possibility of other relationships between race and gender, such
as intersection, are not considered. Black women's issues "slip through
the cracks" of legal protection, 22 and the gender components of racism
and the race components of sexism remain hidden.23
The interactive relationship between race and gender is unmistaka-
ble. Its existence flows factually and logically from an examination of the
structure of dominance-historically and contemporarily-and the ste-
reotypes, myths, and images about race and gender, and in particular
black women, that sustain it. It is perplexing, therefore, that those com-
mitted to eliminating dominance based on race or gender, or both, con-
tinually fail to acknowledge or derive liberating strategies based on the
fact of race-sex interaction.24
Cases arising under employment discrimination statutes illustrate
both the operation in law and the effect on the development of legal the-
ory of the assumptions of race-sex correspondence and difference. These
cases also demonstrate the absence of any consideration of either race-sex
interaction or the stereotyping of black womanhood. Focusing on cases
that involve black female plaintiffs, at least three categories emerge.
In one category, courts have considered whether black women may
represent themselves or other race or gender discriminatees. Some cases
deny black women the right to claim discrimination as a subgroup dis-
tinct from black men and white women.25 Others deny black women the
right to represent a class that includes white women in a suit based on
sex discrimination, on the ground that race distinguishes them.26 Still
other cases prohibit black women from representing a class in a race dis-
crimination suit that includes black men, on the ground of gender differ-
21. But see King, supra note 19, at 268 (suggesting that a part of the function of race-sex
parallelism is to mask substantive, if not qualitative, differences between racism and sexism as well as
to make the experiences of black women invisible).
22. See SLIPPING THROUGH THE CRACKS: THE STATUS OF BLACK WOMEN (. Malveaux &
M. Simms eds. 1987).
23. See H. CARaY, Slave and Mistress" Ideologies of Womanhood under Slavery, in RECON-
STRUCTING WOMANHOOD 20 (1987).
24. See King, supra note 19, at 276-86 (discussing intraracial politics and politics among
women).
25. See, e.g., DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142, 145 (E.D.
Mo. 1976) (Title VII did not create a new sub-category of "black women" with standing indepen-
dent of black males).
26. See, eg., Moore v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 708 F.2d 475, 480 (9th Cir. 1983) (certified
class includes only black females, as plaintiff black female inadequately represents white females'
interests).
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ences.27 These cases demonstrate the failure of courts to account for
race-sex intersection, and are premised on the assumption that discrimi-
nation is based on either race or gender, but never both.28
A second category of cases concerns the interaction of race and gen-
der in determining the limits. of an employer's ability to condition work
on reproductive and marital choices associated with black women.29
Several courts have upheld the firing of black women for becoming preg-
nant while unmarried if their work involves association with children-
especially black teenage girls. These decisions rest on entrenched fears of
and distorted images about black female sexuality, stigmatize single
black mothers (and by extension their children) and reinforce "culture of
poverty" notions that blame poverty on poor people themselves.30 They
also reinforce the notion that the problems of black families are attributa-
ble to the deviant and dominant roles of black women31 and the idea that
racial progress depends on black female subordination.32
A third category concerns black women's physical images. These
cases involve a variety of mechanisms to exclude black women from jobs
that involve contact with the public-a tendency particularly evident in
traditionally female jobs in which employers place a premium on female
27. See, eg., Payne v. Travenol, 673 F.2d 798, 810-12 (5th Cir. 1982) (interests of black female
plaintiffs substantially conflict with interests of black males, since females sought to prove that males
were promoted at females' expense notwithstanding the court's finding of extensive racial
discrimination).
28. See generally Crenshaw, supra note 14.
29. See Chambers v. Girls Club of Omaha, 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987); see also Austin, supra
note 14.
30. The culture of poverty notion is rooted in the works of Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Se. eg.,
P. MOYNIHAN, The Negro Family: A Case for National Action, in THE MOYNIHAN REPORT AND
THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 39-124; see also E. FRAZIER, THE NEGRO IN THE UNITED STATES
(1968).
31. Traditional analyses of the black family compare it to middle-class white families-thereby,
in the face of longstanding oppression, emphasizing its weaknesses rather than focusing on its
strengths. See E. FRAZIER, supra note 30, at 300-02, 328-33. Such studies focus on the attitudes and
behavior of blacks as the source of difficulty in black family structure and fail to account for the
structural effects of oppression or to propose policies that would alleviate the effects of oppression.
See generally A. BILLINOSLEY, BLACK FAMILIES IN WHITE AMERICA 14-15, 122-24, 131-37 (1968).
Underlying these traditional analyses of the black family are myths about the existence of a black
female matriarchy and the detrimental effects that this matriarchy has on blacks generally and on
black males in particular. See Staples, The Myth of the Black Matriarchy, in THE BLACK WOMAN
CROSS-CULTURALLY 335-48 (F. Steady ed. 1981). These myths contribute to the fiction that black
women are doubly advantaged in relation to black men, and to the assumption that racial progress
for blacks depends on the subordination of black women. See Jackson, Black Women in a Racist
Society, in RACISM AND MENTAL HEALTH 185, 254 (1973). Recently, ideas regarding black women
as negative role models have appeared in the formulation of educational policy directed toward
reducing black male school dropout and incarceration rates.
32. In DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976), the
court obviously feared that black women would be doubly-advantaged by a coordination of both the
race and gender components of their claims.
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attractiveness-including a subtle, and often not so subtle, emphasis on
female sexuality. The latter two categories sometimes involve, in addi-
tion to the intersection of race and gender, questions that concern the
interaction of race, gender, and culture.
The failure to consider the implications of race-sex interaction is
only partially explained, if at all, by the historical or contemporary devel-
opment of separate political movements against racism and sexism.
Rather, this failure arises from the inability of political activists, policy-
makers, and legal theorists to grapple with the existence and political
functions of the complex of myths, negative images, and stereotypes re-
garding black womanhood.3 3 These stereotypes, and the culture of preju-
dice that sustains them, exist to define the social position of black women
as subordinate on the basis of gender to all men, regardless of color, and
on the basis of race to all other women. These negative images also are
indispensable to the maintenance of an interlocking system of oppression
based on race and gender that operates to the detriment of all women and
all blacks. Stereotypical notions about white women and black men are
not only developed by comparing them to white men, but also by setting
them apart from black women.
D. The Rogers Opinion
The Rogers decision 34 is a classic example of a case concerning the
physical image of black women. Renee Rogers, whose work for Amei-
can Airliries involved extensive passenger contact, claimed that Ameri-
can's prohibition of braided hairstyles in certain job classifications
discriminated against her as a woman in general, and as a black woman
in particular.35 The court did not attempt to limit the plaintiff's case by
forcing her to proceed on either race or gender grounds,36 nor did it cre-
ate a false hierarchy between the two bases by treating one as grounded
in statutory law and the other as a "plus" factor that would explain the
33. See eg., H. CARBY, supra note 23, at 27.
34. Rogers v. American Airlines, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 229 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
35. Id. at 231. Rogers sued under the thirteenth amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988), and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e (1988). The court disposed of the
thirteenth amendment claim on the ground that the amendment prohibits practices that constitute
badges and incidents of slavery. Unless the plaintiff could show that she did not have the option to
leave her job, her claim could not be maintained. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231. The court also noted
that the Title VII and section 1981 claims were indistinguishable in the circumstances of the case
and were, therefore, treated together. Id
36. For an example of a case refusing to allow a plaintiff to proceed as a "black woman," an
independent sub-category protected by Title VII, see DeGraffenreid v. General Motors Assembly
Div., 413 F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Mo. 1976). The district court's limitation on the ability of black
women to sue on the basis of race and sex was lifted on appeal. DeGraffenreid v. General Motors
Assembly Div., 558 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1977).
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application of law to a subgroup not technically recognized as a pro-
tected group by law.37 The court also appeared to recognize that the
plaintiff's claim was not based on the cumulative effects of race and
gender.38
However, the court treated the race and sex claims in the alternative
only. This approach reflects the assumption that racism and sexism al-
ways operate independently even when the claimant is a member of both
a subordinated race and a subordinated gender group. The court refused
to acknowledge that American's policy need not affect all women or all
blacks in order to affect black women discriminatorily. By treating race
and sex as alternative bases on which a claim might rest, the court con-
cluded that the plaintiff failed to state a claim of discrimination on either
ground. The court's treatment of the issues made this result inevitable-
as did its exclusive reliance on the factors that it insisted were dispositive
of cases involving employee grooming or other image preferences.
The distinct history of black women dictates that the analysis of
discrimination be appropriately tailored in interactive claims to provide
black women with the same protection available to other individuals and
groups protected by antidiscrimination law. The Rogers court's ap-
proach permitted it to avoid the essence of overlapping discrimination
against black women, and kept it from applying the basic elements of
antidiscrimination analysis: a focus on group history; identification of
recurring patterns of oppression that serve over time to define the social
and economic position of the group; analysis of the current position of
the group in relation to other groups in society; and analysis of the em-
ployment practice in question to determine whether, and if so, how, it
perpetuates individual and group subordination.39
37. See Jefferies v. Harris County Community Action Assoc., 615 F.2d 1025, 1032-34 (5th Cir.
1980) (permitting black women to sue on grounds of race and sex, albeit on a "plus" theory that
erroneously treats one basis as grounded in the language of Title VII describing protected groups
and the other as implied to protect a subgroup not specifically protected by law). This approach
overlooks the fact that both race and sex are protected categories authorized by law. The "plus"
theory is generally applied to cases in which an employer discriminates against some, but not all,
women or men, and does so on the basis of a characteristic in addition to gender which courts
consider of legal significance (e.g., discrimination against married women or against mothers). Id at
1033.
38. Cumulative effects of race and gender may be involved, for example, in a claim arguing that
a paper and pencil test (which excludes disproportionate numbers of blacks) and a height or strength
requirement (which excludes disproportionate numbers of women) combine to exclude statistically
significant numbers of black women even though black men and white women are not similarly
affected. See generally Shoben, Compound Discrimination: The Interaction of Race and Sex in Em-
ployment Discrimination, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 793, 793-98 (1980) (discussing what the author terms
"compound discrimination").
39. See L. THUROW, THE ZERO-SUM SOCIETY: DISCRIMINATION AND THE POSSIBILITIES
FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE 184-89 (1980). Courts should follow this approach in any case in which a
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The court gave three principal reasons for dismissing the plaintiff's
claim. First, in considering the sex discrimination aspects of the claim,
the court disagreed with the plaintiff's argument that, in effect, the ap-
plication of the company's grooming policy to exclude the category of
braided hairstyles from the workplace reached only women. Rather, the
court stressed that American's policy was even-handed and applied to
men and women alike.4° Second, the court emphasized that American's
grooming policy did not regulate or classify employees on the basis of an
immutable gender characteristic. 41 Finally, American's policy did not
bear on the exercise of a fundamental right.42 The plaintiff's racial dis-
crimination claim was analyzed separately but dismissed on the same
grounds: neutral application of American's anti-braid policy to all races
and absence of any impact of the policy on an immutable racial charac-
teristic or of any effect on the exercise of a fundamental right.
The court's treatment of culture and cultural associations in the ra-
cial context bears close examination. It carefully distinguished between
the phenotypic and cultural aspects of race. First, it rejected the plain-
tiff's analogy between all-braided and Afro or "natural" hairstyles.
Stopping short of concluding that Afro hairstyles might be protected
under all circumstances, the court held that "an all-braided hairstyle is a
different matter. It is not the product of natural hair growth but of arti-
fice."'43 Second, in response to the plaintiff's argument that, like Afro
hairstyles, the wearing of braids reflected her choice for ethnic and cul-
tural identification, the court again distinguished between the immutable
aspects of race and characteristics that are "socioculturally associated
with a particular race or nationality." 44 However, given the variability of
so-called immutable racial characteristics such as skin color and hair tex-
ture, it is difficult to understand racism as other than a complex of histor-
ical, sociocultural associations with race.
The court conceived of race and the legal protection against racism
almost exclusively in biological terms. Natural hairstyles--or at least
some of them, such as Afros45-are permitted because hair texture is
immutable, a matter over which individuals have no choice. Braids,
however, are the products of artifice-a cultural practice-and are there-
fore mutable; i.e., the result of choice. Because the plaintiff could have
black woman alleges discrimination on race and sex grounds and the court determines that com-
pound discrimination is not involved. See Shoben, supra note 38.
40. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
41. Id.
42. Id
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id.
45. See infra note 59 (discussing other natural hairstyles).
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altered the all-braided hairstyle in the exercise of her own volition,
American was legally authorized to force that choice upon her.
In support of its view that the plaintiff had failed to establish a fac-
tual basis for her claim that American's policy had a disparate impact on
black women, thus destroying any basis for the purported neutral appli-
cation of the policy, the court pointed to American's assertion that the
plaintiff had adopted the prohibited hairstyle only shortly after it had
been "popularized" by Bo Derek, a white actress, in the film "10." 46
Notwithstanding the factual inaccuracy of American's claim, and
notwithstanding the implication that there is no relationship between
braided hair and the culture of black women, the court assumed that
black and white women are equally motivated (i.e., by the movies) to
adopt braided hairstyles.
Wherever they exist in the world, black women braid their hair.
They have done so in the United States for more than four centuries.
African in origin, the practice of braiding is as American-black Ameri-
can-as sweet potato pie. A braided hairstyle was first worn in a nation-
ally-televised media event in the United States-and in that sense
"popularized"-by a black actress, Cicely Tyson, nearly a decade before
the movie "10." 47 More importantly, Cicely Tyson's choice to popular-
ize (i.e., to "go public" with) braids, like her choice of acting roles, was a
political act made on her own behalf and on behalf of all black women.48
The very use of the term "popularized" to describe Bo Derek's
wearing of braids-in the sense of rendering suitable to the majority-
specifically subordinates and makes invisible all of the black women who
for centuries have worn braids in places where they and their hair were
not overt threats to the American aesthetic. The great majority of such
women worked exclusively in jobs where their racial subordination was
clear. They were never permitted in any affirmative sense of the word
any choice so closely related to personal dignity as the choice-or a
range of choices-regarding the grooming of their hair. By virtue of
their subordination-their clearly defined place in the society-their
choices were simply ignored.
The court's reference to Bo Derek presents us with two conflicting
images, both of which subordinate black women and black culture. On
the one hand, braids are separated from black culture, and, by implica-
tion are said to arise from whites. Not only do blacks contribute nothing
46. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 232.
47. Tyson is most noted for her roles in the film Sounder (20th Century Fox 1972) and in the
television special The Autobiography of Miss Jane Pitman (CBS Television Broadcast, Jan. 1974).
48. Her work is political in the sense that she selects roles that celebrate the strength and
dignity of black women and avoids roles that do not.
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to the nation's or the world's culture, they copy the fads of whites. On
the other hand, whites make fads of black culture, which, by virtue of
their popularization, become-like all "pop"--disposable, vulgar, and
without lasting value. Braided hairstyles are thus trivialized and protests
over them made ludicrous.49
To narrow the concept of race further-and, therefore, racism and
the scope of legal protection against it-the Rogers court likened the
plaintiff's claim to ethnic identity in the wearing of braids to identity
claims based on the use of languages other than English. The court
sought refuge in Garcia v. Gloor, a decision that upheld the general right
of employers to prohibit the speaking of any language other than English
in the workplace without requiring employers to articulate a business jus-
tification for the prohibition.50 By excising the cultural component of
racial or ethnic identity, the court reinforces the view of a homogenous,
unicultural society, and pits blacks and other groups against each other
in a battle over minimal deviations from cultural norms. Black women
cannot wear their hair in braids because Hispanics cannot speak Spanish
at work. The court cedes to private employers the power of family pa-
triarchs to enforce a numbing sameness, based exclusively on the employ-
ers' whim, without the obligation to provide a connection to work
performance or business need, and thus deprives employees of the right
to be judged on ability rather than on image or sound.51
Like Rogers, the Garcia case is a fascinating study of the extent to
which antidiscrimination law perpetuates the allocation to employers of a
kind of property right in the persons of women and minority employees.
Out of business necessity, thirty-one of the thirty-nine employees of the
company in Garcia were Hispanic because the population in the area
served by the business was seventy-five percent Hispanic. Most of the
employees were bilingual because many of the company's customers
wanted to be waited on by a Spanish-speaking person. The employer
prohibited employees from speaking Spanish on the job unless they were
speaking to Spanish-speaking customers. Hector Garcia, a Mexican-
American employee, was fired for responding in Spanish to a question
from another Mexican-American employee about the availability of an
49. For further examples of cultural cooptation, see Williams, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC: Regrouping in Singular Times, 104 HARv. L. REv. 525, 538 (1990).
50. Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 267-69 (5th Cir. 1980); cf Gutierrez v. Municipal Court,
838 F.2d 1031, 1040-41 (9th Cir.), vacated, 409 U.S. 1016 (1988).
51. See Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination, and a Jurisprudence for the
Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991).
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item requested by a customer.5 2 The use of Spanish is thus a virtue when
the employer benefits, a vice when the employee does.
In Rogers, the court clearly considered the prohibition of all-braided
hairstyles to relate more to American's choice of the image it would pro-
mote for its business than to plaintiff's race, gender, or both.5 3 It noted
American's assertion that "the policy was adopted in order to help
American project a conservative, and business-like image," but made
clear that the policy would have been valid without the showing of any
business justification.5 4
But what is American's conception of a business-like image? Why
are American and Hyatt-top companies in the United States- afraid of
black women in pageboy hairstyles? What role does sexuality play in
determining the proper grooming and image of women? And should we
distinguish between an employer's fear and repression of black female
sexuality and its exploitation of female sexuality in general, albeit a sexu-
ality constructed to reflect proper notions of the ideally-beautiful, sex-
ual-but not sexy-woman? The business justification requirement
dispensed with in Rogers is specially designed to assist courts in answer-
ing these questions. Properly applied, this requirement should also assist
the court in determining whether American's policy is motivated by the
complex of negative associations with black womanhood, associations
that do not initially appear to affect black men or white women.
III. TRUTHS AND SojouRNS: STEREOTYPING AT THE
INTERSECTION OF RACE AND GENDER
A. Of Changes and More
1969. A picture of me in the family photograph album, standing in
front of the law school, with cap and gown, sad-faced and sullen, dis-
playing none of the joy that should be mine for my achievement The
mortar board sits atop my short-cropped Afro hairstyle, a style that I
have adopted since my parents last saw me at Christmas and since I
have obtained post-graduate employment that will begin after the bar
exam. Since arriving in town for graduation, my mother has spoken of
little else: Not only have I disgraced myself by chopping off my long,
52. Garcia, 618 F.2d at 266-68. The trial judge concluded that this was one of "a number of
reasons that Garcia was fired." Id. at 267.
53. On the de minimis effect of American's policy, the court said that "this type of regulation
has at most a negligible effect on employment opportunity .... It concerns a matter of relatively low
importance in terms of the constitutional interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment and
Title VII .... Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
54. Id. at 232-33. The court also minimized any psychological abuse to the plaintiff as a result
of the policy. American had indicated that the plaintiff could keep her braids as long as she dis-
guised them during working hours by wearing a hairpiece. To her complaint that the hairpiece was
uncomfortable, the court suggested that a larger hairpiece was in order. Id. at 233.
VCol. 1991.365]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
thick hair, I also intend to aggravate my misdeed through the ludicrous
juxtaposition of mortar board and nappy hair. Madame C. J. Walker"
will surely turn over in her grave My younger sister has worn an Afro
for almost a year, but I would not be expected to stoop so low. I will
graduate at the top of my class, receive more honors than I know what to
do with, and take a job that will surely bring prestige to my family, my
law school, and my race My hair undoes all of this, recalling for my
mother her initial confusion over my decision to study law and now
drawing public attention to her obvious failure as a parent for not having
impressed upon me the importance of hair as a mechanism for survival.
I might as well have been an "illegitimate" child
Early 1970& Another picture in the family album. My mother is beam-
ing, smiling across a generation. She is looking down at my nephew, our
family's first next-generation child, an out-of-wedlock legitimization of
our eternal strength, hope, and survival My mother is now beautifully-
Afroed, and her smile is filled with pride, love, and understanding.
1985. In a few days I will teach in a four-day workshop for fifty black
women. The participants have been chosen primarily because of their
status in the corporate world of business and finance My feelings of
performance anxiety seem greatly overshadowed by feelings of happy ex-
citement and expectancy at the prospect of navigating my peers through
the murky waters ofpossibilities and pitfalls for black women in leader-
ship positions. I arrive at the beauty parlor for the grooming of my hair,
which, after a year in braids, has grown to my shoulders. Time is short
and the hairdresser is late. When she arrives, on impulse, I decide to
forgo braids and ask her to apply a chemical straightener to my virgin
hair. I return to work a day later and the '"ignificant other" of a male
colleague addresses me in that chastising, condescending tone of voice
reserved for slaves and women in domestic service: "Every time I see
you, you've done something else to your hairl"
Days later I arrive at the workshop site and greet the participants, my
hair arranged in a style reminiscent of my former for-profit corporate
self Over the next four days, I am frequently complimented for my
competence, unusual insights, and mastery of subject matter, but
55. See P. GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN ON
RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 187-89 (1984). Madame CJ. Walker, born Sarah Breedlove in 1867,
was the first black female millionaire in the United States. She made her fortune selling hair prod-
ucts-particularly hair growers and straighteners-for black women. She also redesigned the hot
comb for use by black women to straighten their hair. She ultimately established factories, laborato-
ries, and training schools, employed thousands of black women around the world, and made possible
the employment and small businesses of many more. Madame Walker remains a controversial figure
in black history, however, because some have attributed her success to the desire of black women for
"straight, Caucasian-type hair," and others have adhered to Madame Walker's assessment focusing
on "cur[ing] scalps when they were in a frightful condition." Id at 188. Whether she or her clients
were concerned with straight hair, they surely were concerned with the length of hair. For example,
her company's 1924 yearbook described her hair products: "[M]any persons who had less than a
finger's length of hair when they began using it, their hair grew sixteen inches in less than three years
[and] the products improved the scalps of persons... whose hair was short and stubby all their
lives." Id at 188-89.
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mostly---especially from those who over the years have watched me alter-
nate between closely-cropped Afros and short, straight bobs-for the
beauty of my long, straight hair.
B. Hair and the Timeless Search for Legitimacy
Hairstyle choices are an important mode of self-expression. For
blacks, and particularly for black women, such choices also reflect the
search for a survival mechanism in a culture where social, political, and
economic choices of racialized individuals and groups are conditioned by
the extent to which their physical characteristics, both mutable and im-
mutable, approximate those of the dominant racial group. Hair becomes
a proxy for legitimacy and determines the extent to which individual
blacks can "crossover" from the private world of segregation and coloni-
zation (and historically, in the case of black women, service in another's
home) into the mainstream of American life.
Black women bear the brunt of racist intimidation resulting from
western standards of physical beauty. This intimidation begins early in
the lives of black female children, continues throughout adulthood, and
causes immeasurable psychological injury and dignitary harm. Such in-
timidation also is a crucial instrument to limit the economic and social
position of black women.56
Among distinct physical characteristics associated with race-skin
color, hair texture, size and shape of nose and mouth, and posterior mus-
culature-skin color and hair texture are most often the focus of popular
attention. And hair, without regard to skin color, has a history all of its
own. Indeed, one may argue that hair texture, rather than skin color,
determines racial classification.5 7 The reason for this singular focus on
hair is not readily apparent, but the answer clearly falls outside the prov-
ince of mere difference.
Unlike skin color and other physical manifestations of race, hair has
both mutable and immutable characteristics. Change in the mutable and
in the appearance of the immutable characteristics of hair can be accom-
plished with relative ease, albeit, for many blacks, not without long-term
consequences. Hair can be cut off, straightened out, curled up, or cov-
ered over either in the exercise of individual preference or to comply with
the tastes or preferences of others. The uniqueness of hair among physi-
56. See P. COBBS & W. GRIER, BLACK RAGE 39-54 (1968); M. WASHINGTON, BLACK-EYED
SUSANS, MIDNIGHT BIRDS: STORIES BY AND ABoUT BLACK WOMEN XiV-xvii (M. Washington ed.
1990).
57. See In the Bronx, an Amerasian Finds His Roots N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1990, at Bi, col. 1
(describing orphan of Vietnamese mother and black American father, who had combed his hair to
make it straighter in an effort to avoid racial prejudice in Vietnam and in the United States).
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cal characteristics correlating with race lies not only in the ability of its
true nature to be disguised, but also in its susceptibility to external
control.
Because the appearance of hair and some of its characteristics are
capable of change, the choice by blacks either to make no change or to do
so in ways that do not reflect the characteristics and appearance of the
hair of whites, represents an assertion of the self that is in direct conflict
with the assumptions that underlie the existing social order. Such self-
assertions by blacks create fear and revulsion in blacks and whites
alike.58
During the 1960s, in the midst of the violent upheaval and the rapid
social change that characterized that period, many blacks chose to wear
"natural" or Afro hairstyles as a celebration of self-esteem, a rejection of
the shackles of racist oppression, or a claim to cultural identity. Those
who chose Afro hairstyles faced stiff opposition, similar to the opposition
that today confronts those who choose braids, including the loss or re-
fusal of employment. In the case of black women, few escaped implicit
associations among full Afro hairstyles, unpopular political views, and
uncontrolled and dangerous sexuality, growing out of national media
coverage of the hunting down and subsequent trial of the activist and
scholar Angela Davis.
Today, Afro hairstyles-or at least some of them-are widely ac-
cepted in all forms of employment, although the extent of their legal pro-
tection is far from certain.5 9 They are considered by many to reflect
personal style-aesthetic choice-and are not generally associated with
the politics of the period of their origin. However, the rationalizations
that accompanied opposition to Afro hairstyles in the 1960s---extreme,
too unusual, not businesslike, inconsistent with a conservative image, un-
58. Some black institutions prohibit their employees to wear braided hairstyles. Job counsellors
at traditionally black colleges often advise students to avoid African-influenced styles when seeking
employment. See Shipp, supra note 3, at C14; see also infra text accompanying notes 87-92 (trans-
mission by blacks of the culture of prejudice based on hair texture and skin color).
59. For cases upholding the right to wear Afro hairstyles, see Jenkins v. Blue Cross Mut. Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1976); E.E.O.C. Dec. No. 72-0979,4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA)
840 (Feb. 3, 1972). Note, however, that in Rogers, in drawing a distinction between Afro and
braided hairstyles, the court intimated, but stopped short of stating with any conviction, that Afro
hairstyles are legally protected. Rogers 527 F. Supp. at 232. Also, even if protected from categori-
cal exclusion, it is not clear whether and to what extent Afro hairstyles may be subjected to different
regulation. For example, courts permit employers to establish different hair length regulations for
men and women justified by commonly accepted gender-based social norms. See infra note 62. It is
not clear, however, whether courts would permit employers to prohibit blacks from wearing a long
or "big" Afro hairstyle such as the one associated with Angela Davis on the ground that only short
Afro hairstyles are appropriate business attire. Finally, although the term "Afro" may advert to a
particular natural hairstyle popularized in the 1960s, the great variety of natural hairstyles con-
temporarily worn by blacks are not subsumed under the term "Afro."
[V/ol. 1991:365
A HAIR PIECE
professional, inappropriate with business attire, too "black" (i.e., too mil-
itant), unclean-are used today to justify the categorical exclusion of
braided hairstyles in many parts of the workforce, particularly in jobs
that are either traditionally conservative or highly structured, involve
close immediate supervision, or require significant contact with the
public.6°
C. In Whose Image? The Application of Antidiscrimination Principles
to Employer Grooming and Image Preferences
By focusing on neutrality, immutability, and the exercise of funda-
mental rights, the Rogers court obscured an underlying principle in the
application of antidiscrimination law to a variety of employer image pref-
erences, including-but not limited to-those expressed through groom-
ing codes. A careful analysis of cases in this area reveals that courts pay
close attention to the eradication of stereotypes, attention in no way evi-
denced in Rogers. These cases also make clear that stereotyping is im-
permissible whether or not the standards set forth in Rogers are satisfied.
1. The Appeal to Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co.
The Rogers court's minimal scrutiny of American's policy derives in part
from its reliance on Willingham v. Macon Telegraph Publishing Co., 61 an
en banc decision of the Fifth Circuit that upheld the denial of a male
plaintiff's challenge to an employer's rule that barred men, but not wo-
men, from wearing longer than shoulder-length hair.62 Although the ra-
tionale of Willingham is far from clear, its conclusions have been widely
adopted.63 Nonetheless, reliance on Willingham, without more, greatly
understates the extent to which employer image preferences have been
found to violate protections against employment discrimination. A
60. See Shipp, Are Cornrows Right for Work?, ESSENCE, Feb. 1988, at 109.
61. 507 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975).
62. Willingham provides:
Distinctions in employment practices between men and women on the basis of something
other than immutable or protected characteristics do not inhibit employment opportunity
in violation of [Title VII]. Congress sought only to give all persons equal access to the job
market, not to limit an employer's right to exercise his informed judgment as to how best
to run his shop.
IM at 1092. The case is cited not only for its support of an employer's right to establish grooming
standards but also for its limitation on the "plus" theory of discrimination-typically conceived of in
gender terms-to characteristics in addition to immutable traits, which bear on the exercise of a
fundamental right. See supra note 37.
63. See Barker v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 549 F.2d 400 (6th Cir. 1977); Earwood v. Continental
Southeastern Lines, Inc., 539 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1976); Fagan v. National Cash Register Co., 481
F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
Vol. 1991:365]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
mechanical application of Willingham in Rogers is, therefore,
misguided. 64
A significant body of authority, not considered in Rogers, finds a
violation of antidiscrimination law in the application of grooming codes
and certain other employer rules65-- especially in cases that involve wo-
men as plaintiffs. 66 These cases are perhaps best explained by the fact
that courts recognize the reality of women's employment disadvantage.
Notwithstanding the gender-neutral terms of antidiscrimination law, the
distribution of employment advantages between men and women is not
symmetrical with regard to everything ranging from initial access, to oc-
cupational distribution, to enjoyment of the economic and psychic bene-
fits of work.
Not all courts have been content, therefore, to rest their decisions on
grounds of neutrality, mutability, or fundamental rights-the justifica-
tions central to Rogers .6 7 Rather, they have based their decisions on the
prohibition of economic, psychological, and dignitary injuries to women
growing out of demeaning stereotypes regarding female characteristics,
abilities and roles in society, prejudicial notions about female attractive-
ness, and the use of female sexuality for business advantage.6 8 Where
such injuries are apparent, courts have not required women to relinquish
control over their physical images or other senses of themselves in the
service of an employer's desired business image.
Thus, for example, a policy that prohibits men, but not women,
from wearing longer than shoulder-length hair is not treated in the same
way as a policy that prohibits a married woman from using her unmar-
64. See, e.g., Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977) (rejecting the employer's attempt
to apply Willingham principles to a policy prohibiting married women from using other than their
husband's surnames even though the choice of name is neither immutable nor critical to the right to
marry).
65. It is easy, even tempting, to make too much of the fact that a particular practice can be
characterized as a grooming regulation. Decisions in cases such as Rogers should not be understood
solely in comparison with cases involving grooming codes, but in relation to a wide variety of prac-
tices involving sociocultural associations. In addition, too much emphasis can also be placed on
distinguishing cases such as Rogers from those that involve overt disparate treatment of all women
compared to all men, see Carroll v. Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979),
or a subgroup of women compared to a similarly situated subgroup of men. See supra notes 37 & 62
("plus" discrimination). An essential element underlying all of these cases is a focus on demeaning
stereotypes that affect employment opportunity either because they keep women out of work, repre-
sent them to the public as inferior workers, or compromise women's private choices in a way that
reduces their enjoyment of work and life by disrespecting their dignity.
66. See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 605-10 (9th Cir. 1982); Carroll v.
Talman Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 604 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1979); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
567 F.2d 429, 439 n.24 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978); EEOC v. Sage Realty
Corp., 507 F. Supp. 599, 607-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
67. Rogers, 527 F. Supp. at 231.
68. See supra note 66.
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tied surname.69 A married woman's choice of surname, like a black wo-
man's choice of hairstyle, is associated in the minds of the women
themselves and others with an extension of the personality, a dignitary
interest. Both are related only indirectly to the exercise of a fundamental
right or to the existence of an immutable trait. Limits on either choice in
the context of employment are associated with stereotypical notions of
the proper place in society for married women in general or black women
in particular. Like the wearing of Afro or braided hairstyles, a married
woman's choice to retain her unmarried surname may be considered a
political act.
Reliance on Willingham further suggests that courts have drawn a
bright line between immutable characteristics and historical or sociocul-
tural associations with race or gender, and that such distinctions should
properly determine the scope of legal protection. Stereotypes about wo-
men and blacks carry overt and subliminal messages about the proper
relationship of racial and gender groups in society. This function is
served no less well by myths and distorted images unrelated to race or
gender-specific characteristics than by those related to immutable traits.
The better-reasoned decisions avoid resting on this distinction.70 Indeed,
stereotypes arise most often not from immutable traits but from negative
associations with those traits. These associations are used to reinforce
the notion that individuals and groups possessing such traits are intellec-
tually, morally, and culturally inferior to members of the dominant
group. Antidiscrimination law should be, and at its best is, directed to-
ward the behavioral manifestations of such negative associations, not to
line drawing based on fixed, immutable, and outmoded conceptions of
race or gender. Concepts such as immutability and neutrality are impor-
tant tools of legal analysis, but they must be used to facilitate, not to
preclude, the analysis of discrimination.
2. Image Discrimination in the Airline Industry. The fact that the
Rogers case was brought against a major airline is itself of considerable
significance. The airline industry's history of discrimination against wo-
men is nothing short of malevolent. 71 Perhaps no industry has fought as
hard to control its image and to seek competitive advantage by exploiting
stereotypical cultural attitudes concerning the physical appearance,
69. See Allen v. Lovejoy, 553 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1977).
70. See, eg., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (employer refused to ac-
cept applications from women with pre-school age children).
71. See generally Binder, Sex Discrimination in the Airline Industry: Title VII Flying High, 59
CALIF. L. REv. 1091 (1971); see also Pouncey, Hers Airlines Aren't Sexy Anymore, But They Still
Fly, N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1988, at C2, col. 1.
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proper place in society, and supposed personal characteristics of blacks
and women.
The industry's practices have invariably involved discrimination on
the basis of women's physical presence and image. The airlines once sys-
tematically denied women in public contact positions the right to be
"short, plump... myopic, married, middle-aged or a mother ... -72
Men were excluded from these positions for no other reason than male-
ness. The image that the airlines sought to portray in selecting its female
employees was that of a chorus line: every member female; every mem-
ber young and nubile; and every member in her own right a potential or
actual beauty queen.
Of necessity, this image control has been sought most often for job
categories that regularly bring employees into contact with the public.
The basis of the right asserted by the airlines has varied from assertions
of a correlation between gender and job performance, to employer pre-
rogative, or to customer preference. Any distinction along these grounds
has generally been found to be illusory. The carriers not only engaged in
the most blatant discrimination against women, they flaunted it-defend-
ing their practices on the ground that few other industries equalled the
industry's record in the number of women hired.73 Decades of litigation
72. Pouncey, supra note 71, at C2, col. 1.
73. In one of the most celebrated employment discrimination cases ever to be litigated, major
air carriers sought to impose a requirement for "femaleness" on the job category of stewardess (now
renamed flight attendant). Relying on the expert testimony of psychologists, Drs. Eric Berne and
Raymond Katzell, and the experiential testimony of officials of Pan American, United Air Lines,
and Eastern Air Lines, Pan American sought to justify the policy of excluding men from the job of
flight attendant on the ground that the ability to perform satisfactorily the nonmechanical and essen-
tially nurturing functions of the job was unique to women. Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc.,
311 F. Supp. 559 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd, 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1971).
Thus, air carriers sought not only to establish that airline passengers preferred female flight attend-
ants, but also that a sound "scientific" basis existed for such preferences. For a critique of the return
of "scientific" bases for discrimination, see D. NELKIN & L. TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS:
THE SociAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION (1989).
In overturning the district court's decision upholding the industry's female-only hiring policy,
the Fifth Circuit concentrated on setting forth the legal standard for maintaining the bona fide occu-
pational qualification exception to Title VII, an exception that permits an employer to limit employ-
ment in a particular job category to the members of one sex, national origin, or religious group in
certain circumstances. (Under the language of Title VII, race cannot be the basis of a bona fide
occupational qualification exception.) Notwithstanding Pan Am's attempt to characterize its claim
in terms of a woman's unique ability to perform the job in question, the court could not help noting
an important motivating factor underlying the industry's female-only hiring policy: the provision of
an in-flight environment "enhanced by the obvious cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide
.... " Diaz; 442 F.2d at 388.
More than a decade after courts struck down the industry's female-only policy, Southwest Air-
lines again attempted to exclude males from the job of flight attendant, this time recasting the indus-
try's earlier female-only preference in straightforward economic terms based on Southwest's claim of
competitive advantage for itself vis-a-vis other airlines, supported also by appeals to customer prefer-
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were required to begin breaking down discriminatory patterns that in-
volved unequal pay,74 and discrimination against married women,75 fol-
lowed by discrimination against pregnant women.76 The battle continues
in the form of contests over maximum weight requirements for women
that are set at levels that perpetuate stereotypes about female attractive-
ness and often impose unnecessary health risks on women77 and
mandatory use of cosmetics. 78
This longstanding chorus-line image for female airline employees
has necessarily had a disparate impact on black women. Although the
airlines first attempted to disguise their sexually discriminatory policies
by pointing to the number of women in their employ, no such justifica-
tion could have explained the near-total exclusion of black women.79 As
with other famous chorus lines,80 the presence of black women posed a
threat not only to the airline industry's sense of beauty and symmetry,
but also to the presumed sensibilities of airline customers. 8' Two distinct
stereotypes of female sexuality exist: one white and one black---one
ence. See Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Nevertheless,
despite some evidence that the image of sexy females had played some part in Southwest's success,
the court stuck to the strict standard set forth in Diaz Id
74. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 763 (D.D.C. 1973), modified, 374 F. Supp.
1382 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated and remanded in part, 567 F.2d 429 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
75. See Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971); Cooper v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 781 (E.D. La. 1967); Neal v. American Airlines, EEOC Dec., Case No. 6-6-
5759, Empl. Prac. Guide (CCH) % 6002 (1968).
76. Compare Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980) (policy
requiring commencement of leave upon pregnancy justified by safety considerations) with Burwell v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) (policy of mandatory pregnancy leave during
first 13 weeks violated Title VII rights for flight attendants), cert denied., 450 U.S. 965 (1981).
77. See Gerdom v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1982).
78. See Airline Retracts Rule Requiring Makeup Use, N.Y. Times, May 16, 1991, at A19, col. 1.
79. The first stewardesses were employed on a commercial flight in 1930, over the strenuous
objections of male pilots and company managers. Binder, supra note 69, at 1101. The first black
stewardess in U.S. commercial aviation was employed by Mohawk Airlines in 1958. B. LANKER, I
DREAM A WORLD: PORTRAITS OF BLACK WOMEN WHO CHANGED AMERICA (1980).
80. See Lambert, Rockettes and Race: Barrier Slips, N.Y. Times, Dec. 26, 1987, at B25, col. 5
(describing the hiring of the first black Rockette). The Rockettes are a more than 60 year-old insti-
tution in New York City, a symbol of New York City's Radio City Music Hall and of the nation.
Russell Markert, founder of the Rockettes, reportedly forbade a suntan on a white dancer because
"it would make her look like a colored girl." Id at B27, col. 1. During the early 1980s, the director
of the Rockettes, Violet Holmes, defended the racially-exclusionary policy on artistic grounds, not-
ing that "[o]ne or two black girls in the line would definitely distract. You would lose the whole look
of precision, which is the hallmark of the Rockettes." Id; see also P. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF
RACE AND RIGHTS 116-118 (1991).
81. Employer arguments about customer preference often lack empirical basis. See Binder,
supra note 71, at 1104 n.80 (casting suspicion on arguments that the airline industry's no-marriage
rule for stewardesses was based on customer preference by citing surveys indicating that 80% of
25,000 passengers had no preference regarding the marital status of stewardesses). The customer
preference argument in Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981), failed
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good, innocent, and pure; the other sinful, evil, carnal, and taboo.82 Air-
lines could profitably titillate white male travelers with one but not the
other. Thus, the practice of excluding black women from female-identi-
fied jobs involving public contact was to be expected as nothing more
than a continuation of the portrayal of the patriarchal ideal of Victorian
white womanhood, of woman as a sex object, but not sexy.
D. Public Degradation of Black Women
Many employers express shock that black women who refuse to un-
braid their hair take such a strong stance, one that could cost them their
jobs, in defense of a hairstyle. More shocking is the recurrence among
unrelated employers of virtually identical solutions to the issue of braids,
solutions that embody overt racist caricatures of the past expressed in the
subtle, symbolic code of contemporary racism. Invariably, black women
are told either to unbraid their hair or to disguise their braids by pulling
them into a bun or cover them up with a wig or hairpiece. 83 This latter
solution-the forcible covering up of a black woman's hair--connotes a
demeaning servitude that persists even in the face of changes in one of
America's most cherished and enduring symbols. For the first time in
the more than one hundred years of the Aunt Jemima trademark's exist-
ence, its current owner has deemed it profitable to reveal Aunt Jemima's
hair.84 But for the color of her skin, the new Aunt Jemima could pass for
to some extent because of the inconclusive nature of data on the question of customer preference for
sexy stewardesses.
82. See, eg., EEOC Dec. No. 70-90, Aug. 19, 1969 (notation on employment application that
black woman was not hired as a flight attendant because she was too ugly and had big lips); see also
Omlade, Hearts of Darkness, in PowERs OF DEsIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 350, 352 (1983).
83. In Rogers, as if to mitigate the effect of its holding on black women, the court noted that
"[m]oreover, the airline did not require plaintiff to restyle her hair. It suggested that she could wear
her hair as she liked while off duty, and permitted her to pull her hair into a bun and wrap a
hairpiece around the bun during working hours .... Plaintiff has done this, but alleges that the
hairpiece has caused her severe headaches. A larger hairpiece would seem in order." Rogers, 527 F.
Supp. at 233; see also Shipp, supra note 3, at 14 (Cheryl Tatum told to pull her braids into a bun to
comply with Hyatt's dress code); Wheeler, Hotel Worker Fights to Keep Cornrows: J. W. Marriott
Supervisors in D.C Call Hair Style Too Extreme, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1988, at D3 (Marriott Hotel's
Director of Corporate Relations said that black women employees with braids had "agreed" to wear
wigs to work). A similar suggestion was made in Carswell v. Peachford Hosp., 27 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. (BNA) 698 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (1981 WL 224). There, however, the suggestion was made for
safety rather than aesthetic reasons.
84. See Campbell, A Battered Woman Riser Aunt Jemima's Corporate Makeover, The Village
Voice, Nov. 7, 1989, at 45. Actually, the wearing of headwraps among African and black American
women has both functional and cultural significance, at least when done voluntarily. See A. Sim-
kins, The Functional and Symbolic Roles of Hair and Headgear among Afro-American Women: A
Cultural Perspective (1982) (unpublished doctoral dissertation) (available from author). Like the
braiding of hair, the wearing of headwraps has been a constant cultural practice among black women
wherever they exist in the world. However, the cultural significance of this practice had been per-
verted in the minds of blacks and whites alike by race-gender stereotyping. Depictions of black
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Betty Crocker. There is nothing wrong or offensive about the similarity
of these trademarks, but the marketing judgment of Aunt Jemina's
owner does reflect the assumption that the public equates progress for
black women with the imitation of white women. Because being black is
an occasion for oppression, avoiding blackness and its attached cultural
associations becomes the essential mechanism of liberation.
Initially, black women who are permitted to break through the bar-
rier of racial exclusion into "visible" jobs involving public contact are
likely to be those who possess physical characteristics close to those of
women of the dominant racial group.85 Notions about the black wo-
man's presence that were prevalent during periods of overt racism and
exclusion are now subsumed in the symbolism that characterizes contem-
porary racism. Rather than focusing on the black woman herself, the
impetus to exclude is transferred to the black woman's hair, first in its
natural state in the form of Afro hairstyles, and then to the black wo-
man's culture as reflected in braided or so-called "artificial" hairstyles.86
The writings of black women confirm the centrality of hair in the
psychological abuse of black women.87 Virtually all novels and autobio-
graphical works by black women writers contain some treatment of the
issue of discrimination against black women because of skin color and
hair texture. Maya Angelou relates her childhood fantasy that she would
awaken from her black and ugly nightmare to discover and reveal to
others her true self: a blond-haired, blued-eyed beauty who, like a true
"Cinder Ella," had been turned into an ugly black girl by her cruel step-
mother.88 Gwendolyn Brooks' fiction describes an unbridgeable space
women with covered heads typically denote servitude, and early depictions of Aunt Jemina show her
not only with covered head but also with exaggeratedly black skin, bulging eyes, a wide mouth, large
red lips, and oversized teeth. These exaggerations reinforce the notion that blacks, especially black
women, symbolize ugliness, and that the black woman's ugliness justifies her servitude.
85. See Whitt, Temporary Agencies Mask Bias with Color Codes Atlanta Const., Dec. 15, 1989,
at A22 (describing the use of code words by employees and temporary employment agencies to fill
overtly discriminatory job orders).
86. Black women were hired in some jobs that brought them into contact with the public but
only in menial positions where their subordination was clear. See G. LERNER, BLACK WOMEN IN
WHITE AMERICA 321 (1972); see also Terrell, A Colored Woman in a White World, reprinted in
BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 333-37, and Terrell, What it Means to be Colored in the Capital
of the United States, reprinted in BLACK WOMEN IN WHrrE AMERICA 378-82.
87. In Rogers, the court set a very high standard of psychic injury, one that arguably applies in
cases in which the plaintiff's claim is based on the presence of a hostile working environment, but
not in cases involving clearly ascertainable economic injury resulting from dismissal or refusal to
hire. It did so by analogizing to the standard set by the Fifth Circuit in Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d
264 (5th Cir. 1980), a case upholding an employer's right to dismiss an employee for speaking Span-
ish; the holding in Garcia has been undermined by subsequent decisions. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
88. See M. ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS (1969).
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between a black woman and her husband,8 9 created by the wife's lack of
light skin and long hair. Through poetry, Brooks celebrates her sisters
who have retained their Afros. Alice Walker frees herself from the "op-
pression of oppressed hair, a ceiling on the brain, a last barrier to spiri-
tual liberation." 90 And in her classic, The Bluest Eye, Toni Morrison
describes the insidious ways that young black girls learn to hate them-
selves-by observing the reaction of adults (including black ones) to
light-skinned female children with "good" hair.91
However, degradation of black women on account of their hair does
not arise solely because some black women wear their hair in its natural
state or in styles associated with African culture. Indeed, when most
black women adhered to the dominant culture's grooming and hairstyle
codes-when many black women sought escape from grinding racist op-
pression by ritualistically straightening their hair-black women were
disparaged because of their artificially straightened hair. The aesthetic
standards of the white society-no matter how well-emulated--establish
a boundary between black and white, good and bad, pure and evil, true
and false, justifying not only the aesthetic or ideal of racial superiority,
but also the social, economic, and political structures of domination that
result from this ideal.
What links Afro or natural hairstyles and so-called "artificial" ones
(such as braids), is a question of assimilation. Blacks who challenge the
status quo, especially its dominant cultural manifestations, are identified
as major threats to central national values. Those who do not exercise
volition in favor of such values are seen as having the stereotypical char-
acteristics commonly associated with black will and willpower-undis-
89. See Brooks, To Those Of My Sisters Who Kept Their Naturals Never to Look a Hot Comb in
the Teeth in CONFIRMATION, AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 84-85 (A. Baraka
& A. Baraka eds. 1983).
90. Walker, Oppression Puts a Ceiling on the Brain, in LIvNG BY THE WORD 71 (1988).
91. See T. MORRISON, THE BLUEST EYE 53-66 (1970). Describing the reaction of two "ordi-
nary" young black girls to the taunts of Maureen Peal, "[a] high-yellow dream child with long
brown hair braided into two lynch ropes," Morrison writes:
If she was cute-and if anything could be believed, she was-then we were not. And what
did that mean? We were lesser. Nicer, brighter, but still lesser. Dolls we could destroy,
but we could not destroy the honey voices of parents and aunts, the obedience in the eyes of
our peers, the slippery light in the eyes of our teachers when the encountered the Maureen
Peals of the world. What was the secret? What did we lack? Why was it important? And
so what? Guileless and without vanity, we were still in love with ourselves then. We felt
comfortable in our skins, enjoyed the news that our senses released to us, admired our dirt,
cultivated our scars, and could not comprehend this unworthiness .... And all the time we
knew that Maureen Peal was not the Enemy and not worthy of such intense hatred. The
Thing to fear was the Thing that made her beautiful, and not us.
Id at 61-62; see also A. KENNEDY, FUNNYHOUSE OF THE NEGRO: A PLAY IN ONE ACT (1969); M.
WASHINGTON, supra note 56; Wolfe, The Hairpiece, in THE COLORED MUSEUM 19-23 (1985).
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ciplined, insubordinate, unwilling to melt.92 Blacks are thus the cause of
their low socioeconomic status rather than victims of that status.93
In the case of black women, assimilation also means the adoption of
the ideals associated with true womanhood. These ideals have their
physical and cultural manifestations in the limitation of black women's
choices relating to grooming, beautification, reproduction, and
marriage.94
Notwithstanding the possible perpetuation of social distinctions be-
tween men and women, blacks and whites, it could be argued that courts
properly accord great discretion to employers in setting grooming stan-
dards because of the de minimis effect such standards have on employ-
ment opportunity. Employees can either comply or seek employment
elsewhere. Moreover, some would argue that black women's disadvan-
tages in the labor market would not be lessened if black or all women
were permitted to work as well as braid their hair. But whether to frame
the issue in a case like Rogers as essentially one that involves grooming
standards is itself a question of substantial political and legal significance,
and ultimately determines the degree to which one considers employ-
ment rights to be affected.
Judgments about aesthetics do not exist apart from judgments about
the social, political, and economic order of a society. They are an essen-
tial part of that order. Aesthetic values determine who and what is val-
ued, beautiful, and entitled to control. Thus established, the structure of
society at other levels also is justified. What appears to be merely an
aesthetic judgment in Rogers is part of the subordination of black women
and is inextricably connected to the more obvious economic judgments
reflected in other cases that affect black women.95
92. See A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND 91 (1989).
93. A focus on volition also supports the notion that the solutions to racism and sexism lie in
the people who are their victims. However, prejudice and discrimination have little to do with the
behavior of out-groups. Rather, they are the result of deeply-entrenched structures in the society
and in the social psychology of individuals. Vices of subordinated groups become virtues of the
dominant one. See G. SIMPSON & J. YINGER, RACIAL AND CULTURAL MINORITIES: AN ANALY-
SIS OF PREJUDICE AND DISCRIMINATION 99-101 (5th ed. 1985).
94. I do not mean that assimilation is necessarily bad or that all black people must or should
retain a visual or other connection to black culture. I do mean to argue in favor of choices that
include those associated with blackness. And I do mean to criticize the empty promise of economic
and social elevation through assimilation to a dominant culture that does not permit or recognize
contributions to the national culture so long as they are identified with blackness. This elevation
denies its benefits to all but a token few blacks.
95. See supra notes 35-37.
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IV. THE NATURE OF KINSHIP
The issues in Rogers defy resolution by resort to arguments about
mere aesthetic judgments, doctrinal confusion, or minimal effect on em-
ployment rights. The application of Willingham in Rogers reflects patri-
archal assumptions about women generally and competing stereotypical
images about womanhood determined by race. These competing images
limit black women's choices in ways far more fundamental than is read-
ily apparent in controversies about hair. And although Willingham and
Rogers appear to reserve to white women the privilege of their personal
and cultural choices, these cases are based on stereotypes that constitute
a ready mechanism for denying employment opportunity to white wo-
men who refuse to express themselves in ways that satisfy their employ-
ers' notions of "white femaleness." These decisions effectively lock
men-black and white-and black women out of choices associated with
"true" womanhood; read in reverse, they lock white women into such
choices.96
Much of the competition between ideologies about black and white
womanhood centers on questions of sexuality, beauty, and motherhood.
Other comparisons stereotype black women as independent, competent,
worldly, and tough, and white women as dependent and infantile. These
characteristics are not attributed to black women in any positive sense-
such as evidence of their successful adaptation to multiple oppression of
race, gender, and typically class, or as such traits would be viewed when
associated with men of any color. Instead, the presence of these traits
necessarily places black women outside of any definition of womanhood.
96. See, eg., Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 766
F.2d 1205 (8th Cir. 1985). Both cases involve sex discrimination based on physical image against
women in upper-level employment. Craft was effectively "demoted" (albeit without loss of compen-
sation or benefits) from co-anchor to reporter of a television news program. Craft claimed that the
television station applied a standard of good grooming to male and female co-anchors in an uneven
way by requiring her to conform to a stereotypical image of how a woman should appear. She
further alleged that she was told that she was being reassigned because the television audience "per-
ceived her as too old, too unattractive, and not deferential enough to men." Craft, 766 F.2d at 1209.
The station reassigned Craft following a telephone survey of approximately 400 viewers in which the
station asked them to rank Craft in comparison with female anchors at other stations. Four of the
questions dealt with "good looks" and "the dress of and image of a professional anchor woman."
Id. Initially the court had to decide whether to treat Craft's sex discrimination claim under stan-
dards governing grooming codes or those applicable to other types of employment discrimination
cases. Id. at 1211
In Hopkins, Ann Hopkins was denied a partnership when several partners of her accounting
firm commented on her candidacy by describing her as "macho," claiming that she "overcompen-
sated for being a woman," and recommending that she "take a course at charm school." 490 U.S. at
235. When Hopkins' candidacy was placed on hold, the partner who advised her of this action
recommended that she "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear
makeup, have her hair styled and wear jewelry." Id.
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Black women are not only "defeminized," they are idealized as affirma-
tively masculine. 97 Thus, mythical views of femininity are constructed
not only in opposition to white maleness but also as a rejection of black
femaleness. Women are therefore socialized to avoid life choices and be-
havioral characteristics associated either with white men or black
women.98
Stereotypes about black men also represent a confluence of negative
images about race and gender. As black women are "defeminized" in
relation to white women, so too are black men "demasculinized" in rela-
tion to the ideal of manhood represented by white men. Black men are
further "demasculinized" in relation to black women based on myths
concerning the perversion by blacks of distributions of familial power
and authority based on gender-a perversion that is the direct result of
the absence of femaleness in black women. These notions typically lead
to the development of policies directed toward alleviating the conse-
quences of racism through the creation of a proper patriarchal balance
between black men and black women.
Stereotypes and negative images of black women serve many func-
tions. They separate black and white women from each other, and limit
all women's choices by perpetuating competing ideologies of womanhood
based on race.99 They make black women responsible for the economic
and social position of black families in general and black men in particu-
lar. Most important, they make black women invisible. The black wo-
man's invisibility serves to blind all women and all blacks to the
interactive relationship between race and gender, leads to the develop-
ment of legal theories and social policies directed at either race or gender
without fully considering the implications of such theories and policies,
and ultimately assures the perpetuation of domination on the basis of
race and gender for all women and members of subordinated races.
V. HEALING THE SHAME
Eliminating the behavioral consequences of certain stereotypes is a
core function of antidiscrimination law. This function can never be ade-
97. See D. WHrrE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE PLANTATION SOUTH 166-
67 (1985) (summarizing the views of social scientists who conclude that the result of slavery and
discrimination has produced a kind of "studdism" and rigidity in black women and implying, to
some extent, that black women are more masculine than black men).
98. This view underlies some of the justifications offered in support of the creation of academies
for black males in urban school systems. See Hancock, Ujamaa Means Controversy: A Proposed All-
Black High School for Young Men Invokes Hope for Success and Fears of Segregation, Village Voice,
Nov. 6, 1990, at 11; see also US. Judge Blocks Plan for All-Male Public Schools in Detroit, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 16, 1991, at A19, col. 4.
99. See Singleton, supra note 19, at 12-17.
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quately performed as long as courts and legal theorists create narrow,
inflexible definitions of harm and categories of protection that fail to re-
flect the actual experience of discrimination. Considering the interactive
relationship between racism and sexism from the experiential standpoint
and knowledge base of black women can lead to the development of legal
theories grounded in reality, and to the consideration by all women of the
extent to which racism limits their choices as women and by black and
other men of color of the extent to which sexism defines their experiences
as men of subordinated races.
Creating a society that can be judged favorably by the way it treats
the women of its darkest race need not be the work of black women
alone, nor will black women be the exclusive or primary beneficiaries of
such a society. Such work can be engaged in by all who are willing to
take seriously the everyday acts engaged in by black women and others
to resist racism and sexism and to use these acts as the basis to develop
legal theories designed to end race and gender subordination.
Resistance can take the form of momentous acts of organized,
planned, and disciplined protests, or it may consist of small, everyday
actions of seeming insignificance that can nevertheless validate the ac-
tor's sense of dignity and worth-such as refusing on the basis of inferi-
ority to give up a seat on a bus or covering one's self in shame. It can
arise out of the smallest conviction, such as knowing that an old woman
can transmit an entire culture simply by touching a child. Sometimes it
can come from nothing more than a refusal to leave a grandmother
behind.
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